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Summary
Latin American nations strongly condemned the September 11, 2001 attacks on
New York and Washington and took action through the Organization of American States
and the Rio Treaty to strengthen hemispheric cooperation against terrorism and express
solidarity with the United States.  Many nations are taking actions  to investigate possible
regional linkages with the Osama bin Laden terrorist network, and to ensure that their
financial sectors are not being used by terrorists. In the aftermath of the attacks, U.S.
policy toward the region will likely include a re-invigorated security agenda, with the
development of new cooperative mechanisms against terrorism. The terrorist attacks will
have implications in several areas, including the extent of hemispheric cooperation
against terrorism, anti-money laundering efforts, Andean counter-narcotics strategy, the
trade agenda, regional economic stability, and policy toward Mexico and Cuba. 
Background 
As in other parts of the world, the United States has assisted Latin American and
Caribbean nations in their struggle against terrorist or insurgent groups indigenous to the
region. These groups generally attempt to influence or overthrow elected governments,
and may use terrorist methods (the killing of noncombatants) to achieve their political
objectives.  The Department of State has designated five groups in the region as Foreign
Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): three in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the paramilitary United Self-
Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC); and two in Peru, the Sendero Luminoso (Shining
Path or SL) and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).  The Peruvian
government significantly weakened the forces of the Shining Path and MRTA in the 1990s,
so that these groups no longer pose a threat to the elected government.  In Colombia, the
FARC and to a lesser degree the ELN, do pose threats to the government, and both have
been involved in attacks against the police and military as well as the civilian population.
The paramilitary AUC, which was designated by Secretary of State Colin Powell as a FTO
on September 10, 2001, has carried out numerous acts of terrorism, including the massacre
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of hundreds of civilians.1  Official designation of such groups as FTOs triggers a number
of sanctions, including visa restrictions and the blocking of any funds of these groups in
U.S. financial institutions. 
Of the five designated FTOs in Latin America, only the FARC is reported to have
links with terrorist groups outside the region.  In August 2001, the Colombian government
arrested three suspected members of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who were reported
to be training FARC guerrillas, but both the IRA and Sinn Fein, the political affiliate of the
IRA, have denied involvement with the FARC.2  At least one report speculates that the
FARC also is a logistics partner of the radical Islamic group Lebanon-based Hizballah
(Party of God) that also is reported to operate out of the tri-border region of Argentina,
Brazil, and Paraguay.3  Allegations have linked Hizballah to two bombings in Argentina:
the 1992 bombing of the Israeli  Embassy that killed 30 people, and the 1994 bombing of
the Jewish cultural center (AMIA) in Buenos Aires that killed 85 people.  In recent years,
U.S. concerns have grown over illicit activities in the tri-border area and the potential link
to terrorism.  According to the State Department’s April 2001 Patterns of Global
Terrorism, the tri-border region is “a focal point for Islamic extremism in Latin America.”
The Department of State includes Cuba on its list of states sponsoring terrorism
which consists primarily of Middle Eastern countries. According to the April 2001
Patterns of Global Terrorism,  Cuba continues to provide safehaven to several terrorists
and U.S. fugitives and maintains ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and Latin
American insurgents, including Colombia’s FARC and ELN (see “Cuba” section below).
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, attention has focused on potential
links in the region to the Osama bin Laden terrorist network. In 1999, press reports
indicated that U.S. intelligence analysts believed that bin Laden was planning attacks
against a U.S. target in Latin America; an attack against the U.S. Embassy in Uruguay also
was reportedly thwarted.4  After the September 2001 attacks, several nations in the region
were investigating potential links to the Al-Qaeda network and also  the potential use of
their financial sectors by the terrorist network. 
U.S. Policy
Before the September attacks, major U.S. policy initiatives toward Latin America
included negotiations for a hemispheric free trade agreement, and substantial assistance to
Colombia and its Andean neighbors to combat drug trafficking.  Relations with Mexico
also were elevated under the Bush Administration, with the two countries vowing to work
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toward a migration agreement on the status of undocumented Mexicans in the United
States.  
Although terrorism has not traditionally been the main focus of U.S. policy in the
region, U.S. efforts to combat it have included anti-terrorism assistance, law enforcement
cooperation, and multilateral efforts through the Organization of American States (OAS).
Through the Department of State, the United States has provided Anti-Terrorism
Assistance training and equipment to Latin American countries to help improve their
capabilities in such areas as airport security management and bomb detection and
deactivation.  Such training was expanded to Argentina in the aftermath of the two
bombings allegedly linked to Hizballah.  Assistance was also stepped up in 1997 to
Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in light of increased U.S. concern over illicit activities in
the tri-border area of those countries. Since the 1994 Summit of the Americas, the United
States has worked multilaterally to increase cooperation on anti-terrorism efforts in the
region.  An Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE), which held its first meeting
in 1999,  was established within the OAS as a mechanism for greater cooperation against
terrorism in the hemisphere. 
Although current U.S. military and economic support for Colombia and other Andean
nations is focused on efforts to combat drug traffickers, the U.S. strategy also affects the
Colombian insurgents and paramilitaries because it contributes to cutting off a major
source of revenue that helps fund those groups’ violent activities.  At the same time, U.S.
policy toward Colombia has been supportive of the Colombian government’s efforts to
negotiate with the insurgents for a resolution to the civil conflict in that country.
Policy Implications of the September 11 Attacks
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, U.S. policy toward the region will likely
include a re-invigorated security agenda, with the development of new cooperation
mechanisms to combat terrorism in the region.  Some observers fear that other U.S.-Latin
American policy issues will receive considerably less attention as the security agenda
receives priority.  Others believe that the new focus on terrorism is vital to U.S. security
and could solidify U.S. ties with the region.  Some also fear that human rights and
democracy conditions on U.S. assistance to the region could be lifted or amended without
consideration of the influence such conditions give the United States in promoting respect
for human rights and the rule of law.  Others believe that U.S. support for democracy and
the rule of law in the region has broad acceptance, and see no sign that it will be sacrificed.
Enhanced Hemispheric Cooperation. The OAS, which happened to be
meeting in Peru on September 11, 2001, swiftly condemned the attacks, reiterated the
need to strengthen hemispheric cooperation to combat terrorism, and expressed full
solidarity with the United States.  At a special session on September 19, 2001, OAS
members invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known
as the Rio Treaty, which obligates signatories of the treaty to come to one another’s
defense in case of outside attack. Another resolution approved on September 21, 2001,
called on Rio Treaty signatories to “use all legally available measures to pursue, capture,
extradite, and punish those individuals” involved in the attacks and to “render additional
assistance and support to the United States, as appropriate, to address the September 11
attacks, and also to prevent future terrorist acts.” Although Canada and most English-
speaking Caribbean nations are not parties to the Rio Treaty, it is expected that they will
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participate in efforts to coordinate hemispheric action.  In another resolution, the OAS
called on the Inter-American Committee on Terrorism to identify urgent actions aimed at
strengthening inter-American cooperation in order to combat and eliminate terrorism in
the hemisphere. 
Some observers maintain that the OAS actions, although important symbolically,
remain vague.  They assert that concrete actions such as stronger border controls and
enforcement against money laundering and other illicit activities are needed.  Speaking at
the OAS on September 21, 2001, Secretary of State Powell urged concrete collective and
individual steps in the region “to tighten border controls, enhance air and seaport security,
improve financial controls and increase the effectiveness of our counter-terrorism forces.”5
According to some analyses, the unanimous invocation of the Rio Treaty masks
underlying tensions in the region over the extent of Latin American solidarity with the
United States.  Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez reportedly was persuaded  only at the
last minute by Brazil to agree to invoke the treaty.  Concerns about the concept of
nonintervention remain strong in many Latin American countries.  As evidence, several
Latin American nations, while pledging solidarity with the United States, also announced
that they would not offer military support to the United States against Afghanistan.
Moreover, polls in Mexico and Brazil reflect public opposition to a U.S. military response
to the September attacks.6
Money Laundering. In light of the attacks, Latin American and Caribbean
cooperation with the United States on money laundering will likely become a litmus test
for solidarity with the United States against terrorism.  Money laundering in the region has
been a major U.S. concern for some 20 years, largely because of its association with drug
traffickers, but terrorist organizations may also be involved in money laundering as a
means of hiding their financial assets. There already have been some reports of Middle
East terrorist groups engaging in financial activities in Latin America, particularly in the
tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.  According to the Department of
State’s March 2001 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 15 nations in the
region are countries of primary concern to the United States because of their vulnerability
to money laundering: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Brazil, Cayman Islands, Colombia,
Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Vincent, Uruguay, and Venezuela.  In the aftermath of the attacks, many nations
in the region are searching for assets of the bin Laden network that might be hidden in
their financial sectors and moving to adopt more stringent anti-money laundering
measures.7 
Andean Regional Strategy.  It is unlikely that the Administration will diverge
from its support of Colombia and its Andean neighbors through the “Andean Regional
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Initiative” (the successor to Plan Colombia) that will provide substantial military,
economic, and counter-narcotics assistance to the region.8  Current U.S. policy toward
Colombia supports the Pastrana government’s efforts to resolve the civil conflict
peacefully, and only indirectly addresses the insurgency issue by helping Colombia to cut
off drug production, one of the insurgents’ major sources of revenue.  In the aftermath of
the September 2001 attacks, however, increasingly violent actions by the FARC terrorist
group, such as the killing of a popular former Minister of Culture in late September 2001,
could ultimately result in more explicit U.S. support for stronger action against the FARC.
Such a policy change, however, would depend on the Colombian government’s stance, the
reaction of Colombia’s neighbors, and whether the U.S. Congress would approve of direct
support to Colombia against the insurgents.  Moreover, it is not clear that the Bush
Administration would want to expand the U.S. role in Colombia when most efforts will
be centered on dealing with the threat from radical Islamic groups in the Near East.
Trade Agenda.  With U.S. policy now focused on terrorism threats emanating from
the Near East, some fear that the Administration‘s trade agenda for the region could loose
steam. While the Administration has urged Congress to complete action on trade
promotion authority, also known as fast track authority, strong differences remain between
Democrats and Republicans in Congress over labor and environment provisions.  United
States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick has argued that Congress should move
forward with approving fast track and other pending trade measures as a tool in the battle
against terrorism.  He argues that such measures would help build an alliance against
terrorism through the advancement of such values as the rule of law and economic
openness.9 Others, however, have questioned the Administration’s linkage of trade
measures with the war on terrorism, and believe that such attempts to spur legislative
passage of fast track could backfire. Fast track authority is closely related to the
Administration’s success in negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA),
which hemispheric leaders have agreed to create by 2005.  Some believe that it will be
difficult to conduct serious FTAA negotiations until the Administration secures fast track
authority.  Another issue on the trade agenda this year is the reauthorization, and potential
expansion, of the Andean Trade Preference Act, a preferential trade program for imports
from four Andean countries. The pact expires on December 4, 2001, and some are
concerned that efforts to expand the program will not receive adequate consideration.
Regional Economic Decline.  The economic slowdown in the United States,
exacerbated by the September terrorist attacks, will undoubtedly intensify economic
problems that Latin American nations were already facing.  Economic growth prospects
for much of the region will be severely affected by the U.S. slowdown, particularly in those
countries dependent on the U.S. market for export growth.   Before the attacks, Argentina
was facing its fourth year of recession, and it will continue to have problems making
payments on its $130 billion in foreign debt.  Brazil’s currency continued to depreciate this
year and sank further after the attacks.  Mexico has been hard hit by a free fall in the
number of U.S. tourists after September 11, and by the significant slowdown in border
crossings.  Caribbean nations, many dependent on tourism, have faced dramatic declines
in U.S. visitors.  Although economic prospects for much of the region will depend on the
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U.S. economy, some observers believe that the Bush Administration needs to take a
proactive approach, such as engaging the region’s finance ministers and financial
institutions in order “to forestall further economic deterioration and prevent financial
crisis.”10  
Mexico.  Before the crisis, Mexico’s new president, Vicente Fox, had forged a high
profile relationship with the United States, but changed U.S. priorities raise questions
about key items on President Fox’s agenda.  In an effort to thwart criticism that Mexico
has not expressed its support strongly enough for the United States in the aftermath of the
attacks, President Fox visited President Bush in Washington on October 4, 2001.  The two
leaders declared their solidarity on anti-terrorism issues and vowed to continue
cooperating on bilateral issues that were discussed during President Fox’s state visit to
Washington in early September 2001, such as border security and safety and migration
issues. Because of its shared border with the United States, Mexico’s cooperation on
tighter border controls will be key to the U.S. homeland defense strategy, and in this
regard, close cooperation with Mexico could be an integral part of the new U.S. security
agenda.   But the new security environment has diminished prospects for President Fox’s
proposal to provide legal rights to millions of undocumented Mexicans in the United
States. Progress on the issue seems unlikely while U.S. attention is focused on security
concerns. Moreover, the new security environment will most likely increase pressure in the
United States to delay implementation of NAFTA provisions that would give Mexico
truckers access to U.S. highways.11 
Cuba.  Cuba was added to the State Department’s list of states sponsoring
international terrorism in 1982 for its complicity with the M-19 insurgent group in
Colombia.   The Communist government led by Fidel Castro had a history of supporting
revolutionary movements and governments in Latin America and Africa, but in 1992
Castro said that his country’s support for insurgents abroad was a thing of the past.   Most
analysts accept that Cuba’s policy did indeed change, largely because the breakup of the
Soviet Union  resulted in the loss of billions in annual subsidies to Cuba. Cuba remains on
the terrorism list today because it provides safehaven to several Basque ETA terrorists
from Spain as well as U.S. fugitives from justice, according to the State Department’s
April 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism report.  Moreover, the report asserts that Cuba
maintains ties to other state sponsors of terrorism and to two Colombian insurgent groups,
the FARC and the ELN.  Some observers believe that Cuba should no longer be on the
terrorism list since it does not actively support foreign terrorism, while others maintain that
Cuba should stay on the list for the reasons cited by the State Department. Whether Cuba
remains on the terrorism list or not, the change in congressional priorities in the aftermath
of the attack could diminish legislative support that had been building for a change in the
sanctions-based policy toward Cuba. Fidel Castro’s remark that the attacks were in part
a consequence of the United States having applied “terrorist methods” for years may also
influence congressional attitudes.12
